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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CENSORSHIP-MOTION PICTURE
LICENSING STATUTE Is NOT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
PRIOR RESTRAINT.
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago (U.S. 1961).
Petitioner is a New York corporation owning the exclusive right
to exhibit the motion picture "Don Juan" in the Chicago area. It applied
for an exhibition permit as required by the Chicago Municipal Code,'
but although it tendered the necessary license fee, it refused to submit
the film for prior examination. Because of this refusal, the police
commissioner denied the permit for exhibition, and this order was
made final, on appeal, by the Mayor of Chicago. Petitioner brought
suit in the federal district court seeking an order for the issuance of
the permit without prior examination of the film and enjoinder of city
officials from interfering with its exhibition. The district court dismissed
the complaint on the grounds that no justiciable controversy was pre-
sented,2 and the court of appeals affirmed. 3 The Supreme Court of the
United States, with four justices dissenting, affirmed, holding that, while
a justiciable issue was presented, there is no absolute freedom to exhibit,
even once, any and every kind of motion picture, and that the Chicago
ordinance was not void on its face as a prior restraint under the first and
fourteenth amendments. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 81 Sup.
Ct. 391 (1961).
In actuality, the problem of motion picture censorship and its rela-
tionship to the first and fourteenth amendments has existed in its present
context for less than a decade. In the infancy of the film medium, the
Supreme Court categorized motion pictures as a business pure and simple,
and hence not to be regarded as organs of public opinion.4 The Court did
1. Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code § 155-4 provides: "Such permit shall begranted only after the motion picture film for which said permit is requested hasbeen produced at the office of the commissioner of police for examination or censor-
ship." The same section authorizes the commissioner to refuse such permit on a
variety of grounds, including a finding by him that the film is "immoral or obscene."
2. 180 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
3. 272 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1959).
4. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 244 (1915).
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not then consider whether state censorship of films was in violation
of the federal constitution since, at that time, the first amendment safe-
guards of free expression had not been held to apply to the states. That
they did, in fact, so apply, was decided ten years later in Gitlow v. New
York.5 Subsequently, it was declared in Near v. Minnesota6 that, in the
area of first amendment freedoms, a "prior restraint" is a particularly
dangerous form of encroachment, to be tolerated in only the most excep-
tional cases. Even after these explicit determinations, the question of film
censorship remained moot until the 1952 decision in the landmark case
of Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson.7 In that case, the Court, striking down
a New York statute banning the exhibition of "sacrilegious" films, held
that motion pictures are a medium of expression enjoying the full pro-
tection of the first and fourteenth amendments, and declared that: "[T] he
importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened
by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as inform." Sub-
sequent to the Burstyn decision, the validity of numerous censorship
statutes was tested in rapid succession. And, although the validity of
censorship in general was never specifically decided, every system of
motion picture licensing or censorship which was considered was de-
clared unconstitutional. The Court's condemnation of these statutes was
specifically limited to the particular statutory standards involved and
their individual shortcomings, especially their vagueness. These stand-
ards included: "prejudicial to the best interests of the people;"9 "harm-
ful; ' 1 "immoral;" "obscene, indecent, and immoral, and such as to
tend to corrupt morals,' 2 and "portrays acts of sexual immorality ... as
desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of behavior."' 1 During this same
period, in Roth v. United States,1 4 it was decided that "obscenity", as
defined therein, 15 was not protected speech within the first amendment.
The Court, however, consistently avoided confronting the fundamental
question of whether the prior restraint of motion pictures through a
5. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
6. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
7. 343 U.S. 495 (1952). The Burstyn case was foreshadowed by United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), in which the Court in dictum
said, "Moving pictures like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose
freedom is guaranteed by the first amendment." Id. at 166.
8. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952). The Court
overruled Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 3, so far as that
decision was inconsistent with the Burstyn holding.
9. Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952) (citing Burstyn).
10. Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954) (citing Burstyn).
11. Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of New York, 346
U.S. 587 (1954) (decided in a per curiam opinion with Superior Films, supra note 10).
12. Holmby Prods., Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1957).
13. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of New York, 360
U.S. 684 (1959).
14. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
15. The test established by Roth to determine whether particular material is
"obscene" is ". . . whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest." 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
[VOL. 6
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licensing system was unconstitutional per se under the doctrine of the
Near case. The unwillingness of the Court to resolve this issue left the
state and lower federal courts in a position of some uncertainty.'6
The present case finally compelled the Court to pass on this basic
question, which has been a prime subject for debate and conjecture since
the Burstyn decision. The issue presented17 was simple and unfettered,
and was so regarded by the Court: "Admittedly the challenged section of
the ordinance imposes a prior restraint, and the broad justiciable issue
is therefore present as to whether the ambit of constitutional protection
includes complete and absolute freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and
every kind of motion picture."' 8 In Burstyn, the Court, while declining
to answer this question,. had indicated that the answer would not follow
automatically from the fact that the motion picture is a constitutionally
protected medium of communication.' 9 This was in accord with the
approach of the Near case which recognized that the protection from
prior restraint is not absolute and that such restraints may be imposed in
"exceptional cases."'20 That exceptional cases do exist has been repeatedly
recognized, especially in the treatment of "obscenity". 21 The Burstyn
decision also made it clear that motion pictures are not necessarily to be
viewed in the same precise manner as other media, inasmuch as each
medium presents its own peculiar problems.2 2 If then there is no absolute
freedom from "prior restraints", if "obscenity" is unprotected speech under
16. "The area of permissible restraint in this field remains somewhat cloudy."
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. City of Providence, 166 F. Supp. 456, 461 (D.R.I.
1958). The unwillingness on the part of the Court to decide the basic issue can
perhaps reasonably be attributed to its desire to await the strongest possible case.
17. "Petitioner claims that the nature of the film is irrelevant, and that even if
this film contains the basest type of pornography, or incitement to riot, or forceful
overthrow of orderly government, it may nevertheless be shown without prior sub-
mission for examination." Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 81 Sup. Ct. 391,
393 (1961).
18. Id. at 393. Mr. Chief Justice Warren in his dissent refuses to 'subscribe to
this formulation of the issue by both the majority and the petitioner. He believes
that "The question here presented is whether the City of Chicago - or, for that
matter, any city, state, or the federal government - may require all motion pic-
ture exhibitors to submit all films to a police chief, mayor or administrative official,
for licensing and censorship prior to public exhibition within the jurisdiction."
Id. at 398. This, of course, is essentially a modified statement of the same question.
19. "To hold that liberty of expression by means of motion pictures is
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments, however, is not the end of our
problem. It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to
exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places. That much
is evident from the series of decisions of this Court with respect to the other media
of communication of ideas." Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03
(1952).
20. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
21. "There are certain well defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene ..... .Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). "Implicit in the history of the first
amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social im-
portance." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
22. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952). To say that
motion pictures are different in kind from the other media of communication is in
itself an obvious truism. The problem arises, however, when this difference is viewed
SUMMER 1961]
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any circumstances, and if the motion picture need not be viewed in the
same precise manner as other forms of communication, it would seem
that the instant decision is fundamentally consistent with the pattern of
decision exhibited in the Near, Burstyn, and Roth cases.
There can be no real doubt that "prior restraints" have been looked
upon with great disfavor by the judiciary of this country, especially in
the last half-century. Nor has the title "censor" been viewed with much
less distaste than that of "tax-collector" in colonial Amercia, or "game
warden" in Sherwood Forrest. As Mr. Chief Justice Warren points out in
numerous examples, the wrongs and absurdities perpetrated in the
name of "censorship" have been manifold.23 But the question may fairly
be asked whether amputation is the only remedy. To say that censorship
is a "prior restraint" and therefore unconstitutional can be nothing more
than a "talismanic test,"'24 the use of a conclusion on which to base a con-
clusion. And although it has been acknowledged that the first amendment
freedoms should be elevated to a "preferred position"2 5 in the realm of
constitutional guaranties, and therefore that any restriction upon them
should be subjected to the closest possible scrutiny,26 it would seem that
in relation to constitutional protection. The proposition that films are a unique
form of communication, and therefore not entitled to the identical forms of pro-
tection afforded to other media, was never rehlly elucidated either in Burstyn or in
the present case. For this reason, the defenders of the proposition are at liberty
to postulate their own theories as to why it is true, while its attackers have shown
similar initiative in theorizing why such a proposition could not be grounded in
fact. For a comprehensive study and evaluation of the problem, see Note, 30 IND.
L.J. 463 (1955) ; Note, 60 YALt L.J. 696 (1951). It is unfortunate that the Court has
failed to specify precisely which features of the film medium render it sufficiently
"exceptional" to subject it to prior restraint despite the strong language of Near.
Its silence on what would appear to be a crucial point may indicate that the Court
did not feel compelled to go into the matter, but simply concluded that the state
legislative authority could have reasonably found that films did possess such an
exceptional character. Implicit in such an approach is the assumption that such a
reasonable basis for legislative determination is sufficient to validate the legislative act.
This in turn raises the fundamental question of whether such a "reasonable basis"
test ought to be sufficient in cases involving first amendment liberities. In this
connection, see note 26 infra.
23. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 81 Sup. Ct. 391, 404-08 (1961).
24. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957).
25. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1958); Murdoch v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943).
26. The case of Shelton v. Tucker, 81 Sup. Ct. 247 (1960), decided about one
month before the present case, would seem to hold that such scrutiny must ex-
tend to the availability of alternative means of public protection. In that case, it
was stated that even though the governmental purpose to be served is legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be attained by means which broadly stifle funda-
mental personal liberties when the end can be as effectively attained by less re-
pressive means. Should then that Court in this case must have considered the
alternative means to censorship? Mr. Justice Clark speaking for the majority,
did not think so: "It is not for this Court to limit the state in its selection
of the remedy it deems most effective to cope with such a problem, absent, of
course, a showing of unreasonable strictures on individual liberty resulting from its
application in particular circumstances," 8.1 Sup. Ct. 391, at 395 (1961). It is
significant that the Shelton case and the instant case were both decided by a five
to four vote. This would seem to indicate a basic and close division among thejustices on the question of whether first amendment liberties do occupy a "preferred
position" in any meaningful sense, for Shelton would seem to have made the avail-
ability of alternative remedies a crucial test of any restriction on those liberties, while
[VOL. 6
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this desirable end cannot logically be reached simply by the resort to the
all-inclusive proposition: all prior restraints are evil. It would appear that
Mr. Justice Frankfurter is correct in cautioning against the epithet "pre-
ferred position" for these freedoms if that designation becomes a substitute
for rational analysis.27  These problems, as they come before the Court,
should not present a clash of absolutes: absolute freedom versus absolute
censorship. Legislation, whether it restrains freedom of contract or free-
dom of speech, is itself an effort to compromise between the claims of a
social order and individual liberty. When the legislative compromise is
brought to the judicial test, it should be viewed less as a harbinger of
evil, and more as a pragmatic assessment of the conflicting ideals in the
particular circumstances. For it is increasingly apparent that, in the
area of civil liberties, there are issues of political philosophy which call
for careful scrutiny, rather than "self-wielding swords. ' 28  The prin-
ciple of freedom of expression springs from the necessities of self-
government, for it is not a law of nature or of reason in the abstract, but
a deduction from the basic American ideal that public issues will be
decided by universal suffrage.2 9 Universal ignorance would permeate such
universal suffrage if the free traffic of ideas, unwise as well as wise,
were not protected. How this basic principle of American political
philosophy must necessarily protect the unrestricted freedom to exhibit
every motion picture no matter how lewd and obscene, cannot be so
obvious as the Chief Justice would appear to insist. Referring to obscenity,
the Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, declared: "It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by social
interest in order and morality.1
3 0
As has been observed, the Constitutional weakness of every program
of motion picture censorship has been the vagueness of the standards
employed. With statutes clearly phrased, the boundaries of which are
narrowly circumscribed to encompass only the most noxious exceptions,
the evils of censorship can be eliminated, and perhaps the "censor" can
take his rightful place alongside the "tax-collector" and the "game
warden."
Robert J. Bray, Jr.
the instant case clearly ignores such alternatives and upholds censorship on a
"reasonable basis" test. It would appear then that the permissible extent of state
limitation or regulation of civil liberties will reman highly uncertain as long as
this judicial division persists.
27. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 75, 79 (1949) (concurring).
28. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957).
29. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SpEEcH 26-27 (1948).
30. 315 U.S..568, 571-72 (1942).
SUMMER 1961]
5
Editors: Recent Decisions
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1961
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVACY IN ASSOCIATION-STATE
CANNOT COMPEL DISCLOSURE OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS
To WHICH TEACHERS BELONG.
Shelton v. Tucker (U.S. 1960).
The plaintiffs, teachers in the Arkansas public school system, were
dismissed from their positions for refusal to comply with an Arkansas
statute,' which required all teachers in state supported schools or colleges,
as a condition of employment, to file annual affidavits giving the names
and addresses of all organizations to which they had belonged or con-
tributed regularly within the preceding five years. All Arkansas teachers
are employed on a year-to-year basis and are not covered by a civil service
system. Plaintiffs brought separate actions in the federal and state courts
to have the statute declared unconstitutional, and these courts upheld the
statute. On a consolidated appeal from these decisions, the United
States Supreme Court, with four Justices dissenting, reversed, and held
that the statute was in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Shelton v. Tucker, 81 Sup. Ct. 247 (1960).
The right to assemble is guaranteed against infringement by the
federal government by the first amendment 2 and is one of the fundamental
rights of citizens in a free society that is protected against state action
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.3  This funda-
mental liberty is not limited to the right to assemble for political purposes
but embraces as well the right to associate for the advancement of social,
economic, religious, and cultural beliefs. 4 It is well settled that privacy
in one's associations and freedom from arbitrary intrusion by the state
are also protected by these amendments.5 While such freedoms enjoy
a paramount position in the jurisprudence of the United States,6 they
are not absolute7 and, where sufficient legitimate public interest requires,
they can be subjected to reasonable governmental regulation.8 Even where
1. ARK. STAT. Ch. 80 §§ 1229-32 (Supp. 1960).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."
3. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. § 1. "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law." DeJonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353 (1937); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
4. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
5. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama,
supra note 4.
6. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
7. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77 (1949) ; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
8. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) ; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954) ; Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) ; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496 (1939).
[VOL. 6
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1961], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol6/iss4/6
RECENT DECISIONS
a substantial public interest has been shown, however, the Supreme Court
has given narrow scope to the power of the government to curtail these
liberties.9 The indirect consequences as well as the direct effects of such
legislation are subjected to the closest scrutiny to determine whether
the statute lays an unreasonably restrictive obstacle on the path of the
free exercise of these liberties.10 For such legislation to be upheld, mere
legislative preference between alternative solutions is not sufficient. There
must be more than a reasonable relationship between the interest to be
protected and the remedy employed ;11 if there is an alternative effective
method of obtaining the same result, which infringes less on these funda-
mental liberties, then such method must be used.12 In contrast, when
the state is acting as an employer, the Court has been more liberal in
allowing some infringement of these rights, especially the right to
associate, recognizing that past beliefs and associations can have a bearing
on the fitness of a person for certain positions. 13 In the field of education,
the Court has upheld both loyalty oaths and the right of the state to
require some disclosure of past and present associations.' 4  The instant
case represents the first time that the Court has been faced with a real
clash between the right to privacy in association and an attempt by a
state to inquire unrestrictedly into all of a person's associations over a
limited period for employment selection purposes.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, argues that a distinction
exists between this case and those cases involving either administrative
discretion to censor communication 15 or vague, overreaching tests of
criminal responsibility.' 6 The majority opinion does not accept this
distinction, but would give broad protection against all state infringement
of these rights.' 7 This protection is granted on the theory that the rights
guaranteed by the first amendment are the foundation upon which a
democratic society is built. Without freedom of thought, speech, press,
and assembly the right of self-determination is a mere shell. The nation's
founders regarded these rights so highly that they adopted the first
amendment to guard against any restrictions imposed by momentary fear
9. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); West
Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
10. ". . . the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a
permissable end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom." Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
11. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
12. Scheider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
13. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958); Garner v. Board of Public Works
of City of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
14. Beilan v. Board of Higher Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Adler v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
15. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (license needed to distribute litera-
ture within the city).
16. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (loitering statute prohibited any
person from going near a place of business for purpose of inducing other persons
not to trade with that business).
17. Shelton v. Tucker, 81 Sup. Ct. 247, 252-253 (1960).
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or changing social mores.' 8 This amendment was a command to treat these
freedoms with greater care than due process ordinarily requires in the
regulation of economic or property rights. Unless there is an immediate
and grave danger to the state, these rights, if they are subject to any
restriction, must be regulated so as to impinge on them as little as
possible. 9
Since these freedoms enjoy a paramount position in the law, it would
seem illogical to protect them from some intrusions but not from others
when the effective restraint on their exercise is the same in both cases.
Even granting the distinction argued for in the dissenting opinion, forced
disclosure of membership in organizations can operate just as effectively
as a restraint on free expression and communication as would a censorship
statute. Disclosure would actually force many members to drop out of
organizations unpopular in a particular area and this dimunition in mem-
bership and financial support would hinder the effectiveness of such
organizations as organs for group expression. Disclosure would thus
hinder free communication and would, in effect, prevent public em-
ployees from effectually exercising their right of belief and expression by
foreclosing membership in unpopular organizations which reflect their
points of view.
Public knowledge of a person's interest in unpopular organizations
could lead to private action against the individual. Since there is no
effective sanction against individual pressure on these employees, the
only way to safeguard this right is to prevent disclosure in the first in-
stance. But even if this information were not made public, as the minority
opinion contends, individual rights still would .not be adequately pro-
tected. There can be many reasons why a teacher could be excluded
from a job and the possibility of proving that it resulted from disclosure
of organizational ties is nil. As a result, the protection one has against
discrimination in employment by the state would be no protection. The
only effective safeguard is non-disclosure. Also, the cases 20 relied upon
by the minority opinion as to the power of the state to inquire into the
background of its employees would appear to be distinguishable. In those
cases, the questions were limited solely to inquiry into the matter of
18. In Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (concurring opinion),
Mr. Justice Brandeis said the following concerning the beliefs of the founding
fathers about the first amendment: "They believed that freedom to think as you
will and to speak as you think are means indispensible to the discovery and spread of
political truth; that without free speech and assembly, discussion would be futile;
... that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American Government."
19. The Supreme Court has always used very broad language in extending
protection over these fundamental freedoms. As was said in Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945), "The rational connection between the remedy provided
and the evil to be curbed, which in other contexts might support legislation against
attack on due process grounds, will not suffice." See note 10 supra.
20. Beilan v. Board of Higher Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958) ; Adler v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
[VOL. 6
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1961], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol6/iss4/6
RECENT DECISIONS
loyalty and were in no way as broad as the power claimed by the legis-
lature in the present case.
It is agreed that the essential problem presented by these cases of
state infringement upon first amendment liberties is one of balance.2 1
It is the task of the Court when reviewing these statutes to determine
whether there is a legitimate public interest to be protected, and, if such
an interest is found, to determine how important it is to the state. Then
arises the problem whether the statute is sufficiently limited in its terms
so as not to unduly infringe on these freedoms. Looking at the in-
stant case in the light of these requirements, it appears that the state had
a sufficient substantial interest in determining the fitness of the teachers
in its public school system, but it is also clear that the. statute was con-
siderably broader than necessary to achieve this purpose. Inquiry as to
whether the teachers belonged to or supported organizations which the
state had determined to be a threat to the public welfare, or as to the
amount of time spent in outside activities and the positions held in such
activities, would have been sufficient to protect the interests of the state.
Here the Supreme Court has enunciated boundaries within which
a state can inquire into its employee's associations. It has left undefined
the permissible limits of state regulation and prohibition of organizations
and the extent to which the Congress, in its investigative function, can
inquire into association. But by its recognition of the fundamental im-
portance of the right to associate and the broad language used in extending
protection over it in the instant decision, it appears that the Court will
make all the safeguards that it has propounded for the protection of
speech and press applicable to the entire area of privacy in association.
James G. Lepis
CRIMINAL LAW-ATTEMPT-IMPoSSIBILITY OF CONSUMMATION OF
COMPLETE CRIMINAL ACT NOT A BAR TO CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPT.
People v. Rojas (Cal. 1961).
Police arrested William Hall for theft of electrical conduit and he
and a truck containing the conduit were taken into custody. Hall, after
stating that he had an arrangement with defendant Hidalgo whereby
Hidalgo would buy any electrical material or appliances that Hall could
procure, telephoned Hidalgo and a meeting was arranged. In the company
of a police officer in plainclothes, Hall met Hidalgo and then followed him
in the truck to a designated place. Hidalgo then drove Hall and the officer
to another place and paid Hall two hundred dollars. Police officers
21. American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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observing the truck saw defendant Rojas arrive and drive the truck to
his place of business. Rojas was arrested the following day as he unloaded
the conduit from the truck. Defendants Rojas and Hidalgo were tried
and found guilty on a charge of receiving stolen property1 and, upon denial
of motion for a new trial, appealed. The defendants argued that they were
guilty of no crime, as the property they had received had been recovered
by the police and therefore was no longer stolen property. The Supreme
Court of California, In Bank, reversed and remanded, holding that the
defendants, though not guilty of receiving stolen property, were guilty of
attempting to receive stolen property, and ordered the trial court to enter
judgment based on the modified finding.2 People v. Rojas, 10 Cal. Rptr.
465 (1961).
When a contemplated course of action is incapable of consummation,
the doctrine of impossibility becomes relevant to determine the legal con-
sequences of the acts actually committed. When the contemplated end is
not defined as criminal, the acts committed toward this end are not punish-
able as an attempt, even though the actor, through a mistaken conception
of the law, believes the contemplated act to be criminal.3 This type of
impossibility, legal impossibility, is regarded as an exculpatory bar to a
conviction for attempt.4 Courts have been reluctant, however, to extend
this line of reasoning to prevent conviction for an attempt where the act
attempted is criminal and is impossible because of a mistake of fact on the
part of the actor.5 This type of impossibility, factual impossibility, has
been further refined into cases of intrinsic impossibility, that is of inade-
quate means to accomplish the act, and extrinsic impossibility, where the
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 496(1). "Every person who buys or receives any property
which has been stolen . . . knowing the same to be so stolen . . . is punishable by
imprisonment .. "
2. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1159 provides that a defendant may be found guilty of an
attempt to commit the offense with which he is charged. § 1181(6) provides that,
"When the verdict or finding is contrary to law or evidence, but if the evidence
shows the defendant to be not guilty of the crime of which he was convicted but
guilty of a . . . lesser crime included therein, the court (appellate as well as trial)
may modify the verdict, finding or judgment accordingly without ordering a new
trial .. "
3. E.g., May v. Pennell, 101 Me. 516, 64 Atl. 885 (1906) (attempted suicide
not a crime where suicide is not a crime under state law) ; Frazier v. State, 48
Tex. Crim. 142, 86 S.W. 754 (1905) (husband not guilty of attempted rape of
wife where achieved intercourse would not be rape) ; Foster v. Commonwealth, 96
Va. 306, 31 S.E. 503 (1898) (boy under the age of fourteen conclusively presumed
incapable of rape cannot be guilty of attempt to commit rape). Contra, Common-
wealth v. Green, 2 Pick. 380 (Mass. 1823) (boy under the age of 14 may be con-
victed of attempted rape although he cannot be convicted of rape).
4. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, 494 (1957) ; Strahorn, The Effect of Impossibility
on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. PA. L. Rev. 962, 968 (1930); Sayre, Criminal At-
tempts, 41 HARV. L. REv. 821, 839 (1928).
5. E.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 312 Mass. 553, 45 N.E.2d 740 (1942);
People v. Moran, 123 N.Y. 254, 25 N.E. 412 (1890); State v. Wilson, 30 Conn.
500 (1862) (reaching into another's pocket is attempt to commit larceny although
the pocket is empty) ; State v. Mitchell, 170 Mo. 633, 71 S.W. 175 (1902) (shooting
at a bed believing victim was there when in fact victim was in another room is
attempted murder) ; People v. Lee Kong, 95 Cal. 666, 30 Pac. 800 (1892) (shooting
at a pole believing a policeman was behind it when in fact he was not is attempted
murder).
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means, though adequate, are misdirected.0 In People v. Iaffe,7 a New York
case, the court applied the doctrine of legal impossibility to a fact situation
substantially similar to that in the instant case.8 The court reasoned that
since a requisite of the crime of receiving stolen property is that the
defendant receive the property knowing it to be stolen and that since the
goods recovered were no longer stolen, the defendant could have no
knowledge of a non-existant fact and could not be guilty of receiving stolen
property. Therefore, the defendant could not be guilty of an attempt to do
so because, ". . . if all which an accused person intends to do would, if
done, constitute no crime, it cannot be a crime to do with the same purpose
a part of the thing intended."9 Application of the doctrine of legal impossi-
bility in the Jaffe case, although subject to some criticism,' 0 has received
favorable comment by legal writers" and has been regarded as binding
precedent.1 2 An earlier New York case, People v. Gardner,18 held that the
defendant was guilty of attempted extortion despite the fact that the
"victim" did not pay under compulsion of fear, an essential element of the
crime of extortion. The court stated that the applicable test of an attempt
is to determine the actor's state of mind and conduct in the attempt and
his capability of doing every act on his part to effectuate the crime. If
these requirements are satisfied, then the defendant would be guilty despite
some fact, unknown to him, which would make consummation of the crime
attempted impossible. 14 Although the court in Jaffe purportedly distin-
guished the Gardner case, the two cases are in apparent conflict,15 and the
rule of Gardner has been applied to cases which would logically fall within
6. Strahorn, The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. PA.
L. Rxv. 962, 971-86, 977 (1930) (suggesting that intrinsic impossibility seldom
excuses criminality, extrinsic impossibility excuses more often, and legal impossibility
always excuses criminality).
7. 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906).
8. An employee was caught stealing cloth by his employer who repossessed
the cloth. The employee was then instructed to take the cloth to the defendant as
previously arranged. It was held that defendant could not be guilty of an attempt
to receive stolen goods under a statute providing that any person who buys or
receives stolen property knowing the same to have been stolen is guilty of receiving
stolen property. Compare CAL. PEN. CoDS § 496(1) supra, note 1.
9. People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169, 170 (1906).
10. Arnold, Criminal Attempts - The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40 YALZ
L.J. 53, 77-8 (1930) ; Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARV. L. REv. 821, 852-3 (1928).
11. Strahorn, The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. PA. L. REv.
962, 988-91 (1930) ; Smith, Two Problems in Criminal Attempts, 70 HARv. L. Rlv.
422, 439-42 (1957).
12. People v. Finkelstein, 197 N.Y.S.2d 31 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1960).
13. 144 N.Y. 119, 38 N.E. 1003 (1894).
14. People v. Gardner, supra note 13.
15. The rationale of Jaffe, that, since the property recovered is not a subject
of the crime of receiving stolen property, one cannot be guilty of attempting to
receive stolen property if the property has been recovered, would seem to apply to
a case where the crime of extortion could not be committed because the "victim"
did not pay under compulsion of fear. In both instances the crime could not be
accomplished even if the defendant did all he intended to do. But see Strahorn,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 989-91.
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the rationale of Jaffe.'6 The two conflicting views retain vitality in New
York, although it appears that the rationale of the Jaffe case is applied
only to cases involving the same fact situation as the original case. 17
Dissatisfaction with the holding in the Jaffe case on the part of the Cali-
fornia courts became apparent in People v. Camodeca18 and Faustina v.
Superior Court.19 In the Faustina case the court implied taat the technical
approach of the Jaffe case was undesirable and that application of the
doctrine should be limited.20 In the instant case, the cou - -neither avoids
mention of Jaffe nor seeks to decide the case in a manner tMt would retain
the basic theory of that case while reaching a different result.21
The area of impossibility in attempts is a difficult portion of the law
in which to construct a legal abstraction capable of rationalzi6ng the decided
cases and satisfactorily resolving the myriad of hypotheficals which may
be posed to test such abstraction. The suggested dichotomy of legal and
factual impossibility, like most legal abstractions, is most difficult to apply
when a fact situation presents itself which is on or near the dividing line.
Receiving property which has lost its status as stolen property could
logically be regarded as a case of legal impossibility or factual impossi-
bility.2 2 The crucial element in determining the applicability of one or the
other of the doctrines in the instant case appears to be the intent of the
16. E.g., People v. Camodeca, 52 Cal. 2d 142, 338 P.2d 903 (1959) ; People v.
Boor, 260 App. Div. 681, 23 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1940); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 312
Pa. 140, 167 At. 344 (1933); People v. Moore, 127 N.Y.S. 98, aff'd 201 N.Y.
570, 95 N.E. 1136 (1911).
17. People v. Boor, 260 App. Div. 681, 23 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1940) ; People v. Moore,
127 N.Y.S. 98, aff'd 201 N.Y. 570, 95 N.E. 1136 (1911) (stating that the Jaffe
case was decided under a peculiar statute and that it should not be extended),
following the Gardner case. People v. Finkelstein, 197 N.Y.S.2d 31 (Ct. Spec.
Sess. 1960), following the Jaffe case.
18. 52 Cal. 2d 142, 338 P.2d 903 (1959) (defendant guilty of attempted grand
theft by false pretenses despite the fact that the "victim" was not deceived).
19. 174 Cal. App. 2d 832, 345 P.2d 543 (1959). Although these cases evidence
an express hostility to the Jaffe case, it appears that previous cases in California have
ignored Jaffe and have not rendered articulate the difference in approach utilized.
See Ex Parte Magidson, 32 Cal. App. 566, 163 Pac. 689 (1917) (defendant guilty of
attempting to receive stolen property even though recovered by police and removed
from hiding place where defendant was to secure them) ; People v. Siu, 126 Cal.
App. 2d 41, 271 P.2d 575 (1954) (defendant convicted of attempting to receive
possession of narcotics though the substance offered was not narcotics but talcum
powder).
20. Fraustina v. Superior Court, supra note 19, at 546 "Even though we say
that, technically, the tires were not 'stolen' nevertheless the defendant did attempt
to receive stolen property." The court also indicated that: "The rule of the Jaffe
case has been the subject of much criticism and discussion. . . . Certainly its appli-
cation sh6uld be limited." Id. at 546.
21. People v. Rojas, 10 Cal. Rptr. 465, 469 (1961). It has been suggested that
the only fault with the Jaffe case is the rule relating to the status of the stolen
property. Smith, op. cit. supra note 11, at 440-42. The court in the principal case
reaches the same conclusion as to the property (i.e. property recovered by the police
no longer retains its status as stolen property) but reaches a contrary result.
22. Using the rationale of Jaffe, there can be no attempt because even if the
defendant did all he intended to do it would be no crime. Using the rationale of
Gardner, an attempt has been effectuated. The defendant intended to receive stolen
goods and carried out his intention with apparent ability to commit the crime in
the way intended. That some fact, unknown to the defendant, made the crime im-
possible to consummate will not excuse criminality.
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actor.23 In the fact situation of the Jaffe case and the instant case, the
actor, in fact, had two intentions; he intended to receive the particular
goods involved and he also intended to receive stolen goods. In both cases,
furthermore, he did all the external acts of which he was capable to
effectuate both intents. In the Jaffe case, the court related the intent of
the actor only tq{the specific goods involved; since the goods were not,
in fact, stolen, tie successful completion of the attempt to receive them
would not be aiFriminal act. The doctrine of legal impossibility was
invoked, therefu .,, to bar a conviction for attempt. In the instant case,
the court relates the actor's intent to stolen goods as such and regards the
fact that the goods are no longer stolen as a mistake of fact onl the part
of the actor in no way altering his intent ;24 on this basis, it applies the rule
of factual impossibility. From a purely logical point of view, either analysis
would appear to be tenable.
It is submitted, however, that the real issue in such cases is one not
of logic but of policy, and that the conclusion of the court in the instant
case represents a sounder and more realistic approach to the problem.
It is clear that the pivotal factor in the instant case was the fact that the
court felt that the acts of the defendants should be punishable.25 This
approach is not as arbitrary as it might appear at first; the defendants
could not be convicted of the crime of receiving stolen property because
the property that they received was in fact no longer stolen. This excusing
factor was not within the knowledge or control of the defendants and
evidenced no intention on their part to cease their actions voluntarily.
Accepting the social norm as established by defining certain acts as criminal,
the issue becomes whether the defendants' acts, though not a violation of
the defined standard, are such as should be punished within the spirit, if
not the letter, of the law. The defendants had done all that was necessary
on their part to allow conviction for the crime of receiving stolen property.
Through fortuitous circumstances, beyond their control, they could not
be convicted of the completed crime. Given a defendant who intends to
commit a crime, who does every act necessary on his part to effectuate
that intent, but who cannot be convicted of the crime because an essential
element of the defined standard is not present, technical rules to prevent
conviction of a lesser related offense seem more attuned to the legal thought
of a prior century. Attempts should not be considered in the abstract but
23. See HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES Or CRIMINAL LAW 127 (1947). This state-
ment is made assuming that the requisite overt act by the defendant was committed.
This note has not attempted to examine the distinction between "preparation" and
an overt act. See Smith, op. cit. supra note 11, and compare HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES Or CRIMINAL LAW 596, n.49 (2d ed. 1960).
24. See HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES Or CRIMINAL LAW 127 (1947); Sayre,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 854.
25. People v. Rojas, 10 Cal. Rptr. 465, 468 (1961). "In our opinion the conse-
quences of intent and acts such as those of the defendants here should be more
serious than pleased amazement that because of the timeliness of the police the
projected criminality was not merely detected but also wiped out."
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rather in relation to the crime attempted.26 Acts inimical to the public
welfare are defined as crimes and those committing the acts are punishable.
When such acts are performed by an individual, but an element of the crime
beyond his control is not present, he has not committed the crime defined.
His acts, however, are no less dangerous to society. Imposition of a lesser
punishment for attempt seems appropriate to effectuate the policy of the law.
Edward C. McCardle
DIVORCE-SEPARATION AGREEMENT-SUPPORT PROVISIONS IN
SEPARATION AGREEMENT ARE NOT SUPERSEDED By
SUBSEQUENT DIVORcE DECREE.
Hughes v. Hughes (N.Y. 1960).
In August, 1952, the defendant in the instant case brought an action
for annulment or separation and was awarded a separation by the Su-
preme Court, Queens County, New York. His wife, plaintiff in the in-
stant case, was given custody of their child and the husband was re-
quired to pay fifty dollars per week for the support of the child "until
she becomes of age", which in New York is twenty-one. On appeal, in
April, 1953, the judgment was modified to deny a separation to either
party, but the provision for support was affirmed.1 In May, 1953, the
parties entered into an agreement which provided, among other things,
that the husband would continue to pay the wife fifty dollars per week
for the support of the daughter "in accordance with the decree granted
. . . in the Supreme Court, Queens County."'2 The agreement also pro-
vided that it was to remain in effect notwithstanding any future divorce,
that the support provision was to be embodied in and made part of
any subsequent divorce decree, that neither party had the right to ask
for a revision of any terms of the agreement, and that the agreement
was to be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of New
York. In July, 1953, the wife was granted a divorce by a Texas court,
and the husband, who appeared in the action, was directed to pay fifty
dollars per week support for the child until she reached eighteen. Sub-
sequently, the wife sought to have the support raised to one hundred
dollars per week, but this was denied by the Texas court. The hus-
26. Arnold, op. cit. supra note 10, suggesting that the chief difficulty with a
legal abstraction in regard to attempts is that of making an attempt a crime unto
itself. The author argues persuasively that no such generalization is possible and
that the rules governing a particular attempt must be formulated in accordance
with the policy of the statute in punishing the completed crime.
1. Hughes v. Hughes, 120 N.Y.S.2d 879 (App. Div. 1953).
2. Hughes v. Hughes, 208 N.Y.S.2d 308, 310 (App. Div. 1960).
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band made the required payments until the daughter became eighteen but
failed to provide support thereafter. The wife then sought to enforce
by contempt proceedings the support ordered by the original New York
separation decree, but the New York court declined to grant enforcement
and vacated its prior decree on the ground that it had been superseded
by the subsequent Texas divorce decree.3 The wife thereupon com-
menced the instant action to enforce the separation agreement. The trial
court entered judgment for the plaintiff and defendant appealed. The
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, with two justices dis-
senting, affirmed, holding that the separation agreement was not super-
seded by the Texas divorce decree but remained an enforceable contract.
Hughes v. Hughes, 208 N.Y.S. 2d 308 (App. Div. 1960).
Separation agreements are generally enforceable if they conform with
the customary requirements of a valid contract, are fair, and are not
made primarily to facilitate the procurement of a divorce.4 In subsequent
divorce proceedings, the court will usually adopt or incorporate the sup-
port provisions of the agreement,5 although it goes without saying that
individual parties cannot limit the power of the court to make adequate
provision for support. 6 When an agreement is incorporated in a subse-
quent divorce decree, there is a split of authority as to whether or not
the agreement is merged into and superseded by the decree. Many states
permit the support provision of the incorporated agreement to be modified
upon the same terms as any other alimony decree.7 This is true even
though the agreement, as in the instant case, contains a provision for-
bidding modification.8 Other states, including both New York and Texas,
treat the agreement as a continuing, enforceable contract, even though
the decree itself may be subsequently modified. 9 Where not incorporated
in the decree, the agreement would generally remain -in effect.' 0 In the
instant case, then, the separation agreement would remain in effect in
any event, since it clearly was not incorporated in the divorce decree,
and since it would remain in effect and enforceable under Texas law
whether or not incorporated in such a decree. Inasmuch as Texas
would recognize the continued enforceability of the contract, 1 New York
3. Hughes v. Hughes, 13 Misc. 2d 951, 178 N.Y.S.2d 496 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
4. E.g., North v. North, 339 Mo. 1226, 100 S.W.2d 582 (1936).
5. E.g., Hobbs v. Hobbs, 72 Colo. 190, 210 Pac. 398 (1922); Warner v. Warner,
219 Minn. 59, 17 N.W.2d 58 (1944).
6. Moog v. Moog, 203 Cal. 406, 264 Pac. 490 (1928); Russell v. Russell,
247 Ala. 284, 24 So. 2d 124 (1945) (dictum).
7. Adams v. Adams, 229 Ala. 588, 159 So. 80 (1934); Hough v. Hough, 26
Cal. 2d 605, 160 P.2d 15 (1945).
8. Ward v. Ward, 48 R.I. 60, 135 At. 241 (1926).
9. Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N.Y. 296, 26 N.E.2d 265 (1940); Brady v. Hyman,
230 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
10. Bier v. Bier, 116 Colo. 89, 178 P.2d 674 (1947) ; Maisch v. Maisch, 87
At. 729 (1913).
11. Brady v. Hyman, 230 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). An appeal to a
suit brought on the contract in this case was decided the same day and the
contract right was enforced. Hyman v. Brady, 230 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950).
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would not be denying full faith and credit to the Texas decree by like-
wise recognizing its continued existence. 12
Since the agreement was not incorporated in the divorce decree in
the instant case, it would be subject to all ordinary contract defenses.'3
However this is not the ordinary case in which it is argued that the
agreement should be set aside because it was obtained by fraud 14 or
duress,15 but rather it was contended that the wife repudiated the con-
tract. Mr. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, contended that the cumulative
effect of the wife's actions in submitting the question of the child's sup-
port to the Texas court independently of the agreement (which provided
that the support provision should be embodied in a subsequent decree),
in applying to the Texas court for an increase in the amount of support,
and in seeking to punish her husband for contempt under the 1952 decree
amounted to both an abandonment and a repudiation of the agreement.
The majority opinion countered this by simply stating without elabora-
tion that the record was "barren of evidence of abandonment." There
is little authority as to what would amount to a repudiation of a separa-
tion agreement as a matter of law. In Hettich v. Hettich,16 the failure
of a wife to place a separation agreement before a foreign court and have
it incorporated in a divorce decree did not prevent her from subsequently
bringing suit on the agreement.' 7 In Schmelzel v. Schmelzel, s the wife
applied to the court to have her support raised where the amount had
been set by a separation decree incorporating the terms of an agree-
ment. The court held that the husband's acquiescence to the support
ordered was not acquiescence to an attempt to repudiate the agreement.
If the husband then can stand on the contract in spite of attempts by
the wife to repudiate, it would seem that the wife should likewise be
permitted to stand on the contract after having made an unsuccessful
attempt at repudiation. While the cumulation of the wife's actions in
this case, and particularly her application to the Texas court for increased
support, would seem to be sufficient to support a finding that she had in
fact repudiated the contract, in the absence of controlling precedent, and
12. In Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933), the Supreme Court
required full faith and credit to be given to a Georgia decree ordering support to
be paid for a child. The decree in effect placed a limit on the father's liability to
support the child and even the state of South Carolina's interest in supporting the
child could not infringe on this limit. That case, however, did not involve a separa-
tion agreement.
13. E.g., Davis v. Davis, 49 Cal. App. 2d 239, 121 P.2d 523 (1942).
14. Matt v. Matt, 115 Colo. 589, 178 P.2d 419 (1947).
15. Supra, note 13.
16. 304 N.Y. 8, 105 N.E.2d 601 (1952).
17. In that case, however, there is no showing that the parties agreed to in-
corporate the agreement in a subsequent divorce decree or that the wife asked for
support in the divorce action. The court said that at best it was a question of fact
whether she intended to surrender a contract right. Clearly, this would not be con-
trolling precedent in the instant case.
18. 287 N.Y. 21, 38 N.E.2d 114 (1941).
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with the evidence of the wife's intent equivocal at best, 19 it would be
difficult to overrule as a matter of law the fact determination that was
made.20
This case points up the problem that is inherent in those jurisdic-
tions which do not merge a separation agreement into a subsequent
divorce decree. The contract rights arising from such agreements are
not readily subject to modification by the courts, whereas the support
decree is.2 1 In such a situation, the support currently ordered by the
court does not always define the rights and liabilities of the parties in-
volved.2 2 This anomaly is generally rather dubiously explained away
by pointing out the difference in the remedies available. The extra-
ordinary remedy of contempt proceedings is available to enforce the
decree whereas a party seeking to enforce the agreement is limited to
contract remedies. 23 Whether or not this explanation is satisfactory, there
appears to be no discernable trend among the states that recognize the
continued existence of the contract to adopt a merger doctrine. These
states view the separation agreement, like other out of court settle-
ments, with favor, subject of course to the state's interest in the matter.24
In such a state, the agreement would have more utility, especially where
each party had enough property to satisfy any contract claims.
William J. O'Kane
EVIDENCE-IMPEACHMENT ov A PARTY'S OWN WITNESS-STATE
MAY INQUIRE INTO PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVICTION OF
WITNESS ON DIRECT EXAMINATION.
State v. Holley (N.J. 1961).
The defendant .sold Edward Baker a wrist watch for two dollars.
Baker subsequently discovered that the wrist watch was defective, and
returned to the site of the purchase in search of the seller, but his
19. The actions cited by the minority opinion would also support an inference
that the wife had simply attempted to secure an additional protection without any
conscious intent to waive or relinquish her contract rights. It may be that the court
was influenced to resolve this question in favor of the wife by considerations of
policy dictating that the support of minor children be insured.
20. The instant case is distinquishable from others involving support orders
differing from agreed upon amounts. In all prior cases, one party consistently abided
by the agreement. Here, both parties were present in the divorce action but neither
had the agreement incorporated in the divorce decree, even though the agreement
provided for such incorporation. Query which party would be standing on the agree-
ment and which would be claiming that the other had repudiated had the Texas
court increased the support as the wife requested?
21. Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N.Y. 296, 26 N.E.2d 265 (1940); Brady v. Hyman,
230 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N.Y. 296, 26 N.E.2d 265 (1940).
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efforts were unsuccessful. Later the same day, while engaged in his
employment on an ice truck, Baker saw the defendant and sought to re-
claim the purchase price of the watch. Defendant retreated into a nearby
apartment house and obtained a shotgun from his third floor apartment,
with which he shot and killed Baker as the latter was ascending the
stairway. The police investigation at the scene of the crime uncovered
no weapon of any kind other than the shotgun. Eleven hours later, in
response to a telephone call from William Jordan, the defendant's brother-
in-law, the police found on the stairway an ice pick, which Jordan and
the defendant's wife claimed to have discovered as they ascended the
stairway. At trial, the defense in their opening statement outlined a claim
of self-defense and stated that they would prove that Baker had attacked
the defendant with an ice pick. As the state's case unfolded,' the in-
vestigating officers were examined by both the prosecutor and defense
counsel about the ice pick. The state then called Jordan and, after a
few preliminary questions, asked him whether he had ever been convicted
of a crime. Over objection by the defense, the witness replied that he
had previously been convicted of murder, and the prosecutor then pro-
ceeded to elicit from him his part in the discovery of the ice pick.2 The
defendant was convicted of murder and appealed directly to the Supreme
Court of New Jersey on the sole ground that the trial court had erred
in permitting the state to show Jordan's prior conviction. The Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the state could properly call
this witness and elicit the fact of his previous criminal conviction, finding
both statutory authority3 and a sound basis in trial practice4 for this
result. State v. Holley, 166 A. 2d 758 (N.J. 1961).
The common law rule prohibiting a party from impeaching his own
witness has found almost universal acceptance5 despite a constant deluge
1. The state in the presentation of its case was endeavoring to develop the
criminal incident in its totality and in its natural sequence. State v. Holley, 166 A.2d
758, 760 (N.J. 1961).
2. The state introduced the ice pick into evidence at some time prior to the
appearance of Jordan on the stand, but the opinion does not indicate the precise time
at which it was introduced.
3. N.J. Rev. STAr. § 2A: 81-12 (1951): "For the purpose of affecting the
credibility of any witness, his interest in the result of the action, proceeding or matter
of his conviction of any crime may be shown by examination or otherwise, and his
answers may be contradicted by other evidence." (Emphasis added.)
4. The court said that it was permissible for the state to anticipate the defense
argument and to create the inference that the ice pick was "planted." The prosecutor
apparently had been advised that defendant would testify that he was attacked by
Baker with an ice pick and that he had told the police about the ice pick at the
time of his arrest. State v. Holley, 166 A.2d 758, 761 (N.J. 1961).
5. Smith v. United States, 57 App. D.C. 71, 17 F.2d 223 (1927); Price v. Cox,
242 Ala. 568, 7 So. 2d 288 (1942); Tullis v. Tullis, 335 Iowa 428, 16 N.W.2d 623(1944). Dean Wigmore sets forth the three traditional reasons for the rule against
self-impeachment: (1) that a party is bound by his witness's uncontradicted state-
ments; (2) that a party "vouches" for the credibility of his witness; and (3) that
to allow self-impeachment would be to enable a party to coerce a witness into
giving favorable testimony. The same commentator also cogently summarizes the
many criticisms of these reasons, the first two of which would appear to be falacious
on their face. See 3 WIGMORS, EVIDENCP §§ 897-899 (3d ed. 1940).
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of criticism from the commentators. 6 Even the strict adherents of the
rule, however, recognize an exception in the case of a witness whom
a party is compelled to call. 7 Furthermore, a party is always permitted
to introduce other evidence to controvert the facts to which his witness
has testified.8 A few courts have permitted a circumvention of the rule
against self-impeachment by calling the witness as a witness of the court,
subject to examination by both parties "in the nature of cross examina-
tion."9 Recently, there has been significant encroachment upon the gen-
eral prohibition against self-impeachment, as an increasing number of
courts have come to permit a party to impeach his own witness by the
use of prior contradictory statements.10 These jurisdictions have gen-
erally attached two conditions to such self-impeachment: there must be
an element of surprise" and the witness's testimony must be damaging
to the case of the party who called him.1 2 A number of other states
accomplish the same result by permitting the calling party to question
the witness about a prior statement for the purpose of "refreshing his
memory." 3 Despite this aforementioned encroachment upon the general
rule, courts generally prohibit self-jmpeachment relating to bad char-
acter, bias, interest, or corruption.' 4 New Jersey, in the case of State
v. Fox,15 decided a decade before the instant case, departed from this
6. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCx, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 64 (1947);
MCCORMICK, EVIDENC § 38 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EViDENCE 64
(1954); 3 WIGMOR, EvIDNCE §§ 896-899 (3d ed. 1940). See also Ladd, Impeach-
ment of One's Witness, 4 U. CHI. L. Rgv. 69, 96 (1936).
7. The traditional case in which the exception was recognized was that of
attesting witnesses to a will. Whitney v. Morey, 63 N.H. 448, 2 At. 899 (1886).
It was then extended to include witnesses who had been certified in the indictment.
People v. Connor, 295 Mich. 1, 294 N.W. 74 (1940). The concept of "compulsion"
has recently been extended to include a witness in a prosecution for murder whose
testimony was necessary to prove premeditation. Meeks v. United States, 179 F.2d
319 (9th Cir. 1950) (witness impeached by prior criminal convictions).
8. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Everett, 232 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1956)
Vondraschak v. Dignan, 200 Minn. 530, 274 N.W. 609 (1937); Talley v. Richart,
353 Mo. 912, 185 S.W.2d 23 (1945).
9. United States v. Young, 26 F. Supp. 574 (W.D. Tex. 1939); People v.
Hundley, 2 Ill. 2d 244, 122 N.E.2d 568 (1954).
10. See Note, 62 YALE L.J. 650, 651, n.4 (1953), for an exhaustive list of those
states which now sanction self-impeachment by prior contradictory statements either
by statute or by judicial decision. The New Jersey courts refer to this process
as one of "neutralization." State v. Perillo, 18 N.J. Super. 537, 77 A.2d 496 (1950).
11. Young v. United States, 97 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1938). The tendency today
is to construe "surprise" so liberally that it is no longer restrictive. E.g., Wheeler
v. United States, 211 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (prosecutor given notice that witness
would repudiate her statement six weeks before trial commenced still permitted to
claim surprise). Contrast the strict interpretation given to the "surprise" element
in Selden v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 50, 43 A.2d 571 (1945).
12. People v. Le Beau, 39 Cal. 2d 146, 245 P.2d 302 (1952) ; Ciardella v. Parker,
18 N.J. Super. 549, 87 A 2d 727 (App. Div. 1952).
13. People v. Michaels, 335 Ill. 590, 167 N.E. 857 (1929).
14. 3 WIGMORP, EVIDENCE § 901 (3d ed. 1940). But see the following state
statutes which permit self-impeachment relating to "bad character" if the witness
is "indispensable": 28 ARK. STAT. Ann. § 1-706 (1947); Ky. CRIM. CODE PRAC.
ANN. § 596 (Carroll 1948) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1726 (1946).
15. 12 N.J. Super. 132, 79 A.2d 76 (App. Div. 1951). The witness had been
previously convicted of receiving stolen goods, and he testified to having the same
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practically unbroken line of authority and adopted the position that the
state in a criminal case may elicit from witnesses, whom it has called,
information concerning their prior criminal convictions; furthermore, no
element of surprise was required for such self-impeachment. The pro-
priety of this position was sustained on the theory that the jury should
be given all of the available information which would aid in evaluating
the witness's testimony,16 and, alternatively, to protect the state from
the inference that it was withholding vital information in regard to the
witness' credibility.17 Very little judicial reliance has been placed upon
the New Jersey statute in this connection due to the ambiguity of its
language.' 8 The Fox doctrine was subsequently affirmed by the New
Jersey court in State v. Costa19 however; that case set aside a verdict
where the prior criminal conviction of a witness was introduced as
substantive evidence of the guilt of the defendant.2° The validity of al-
lowing the state to attack the basis of the defendant's case before he has
presented it is a matter of the order of proof, the regulation of which
is within the court's discretion.2 1 The unique position of the New Jersey
courts on the issue of self-impeachment by prior criminal conviction has
goods to defendant at a later date. The testimony was for the purpose of identify-
ing as stolen goods those which were the subject matter of the prosecution against
Fox for the receipt of stolen goods.
16. State v. Slack, 38 Atl. 311 (Vt. 1913).
17. See Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957). Cf. State v. Greely, 11 N.J. 485,
95 A.2d 1 (1953).
18. N.J. Rnv. STAT. § 2A81-12 (1951), note 4, supra. Although the court cites
the statute in support of the instant decision, it does not define the statutory
language "by examination or otherwise." It is at least arguable that the word
"examination" is used only to distinguish oral elicitation of the fact of interest or
prior conviction from impeachment by other means, such as by judicial record of
conviction. If such were the case, "examination" could be construed as being
synonymous with "cross-examination" for the purpose of the problem in the instant
case. Although it is impossible to determine what weight the court attached to the
statutory language, the strong emphasis on trial tactics suggests that the outcome
would have been the same in the absence of the statute.
19. 11 N.J. 239, 94 A.2d 303 (1953).
20. The state called five witnesses and elicited from each the single fact that
he had been convicted of operating a gambling house at a specified location, the
identical offense with which the defendant was charged. Clearly, this served no
purpose of impeachment. Significantly, the instant decision does not consider the
possibility that the state was using Jordan's conviction as disguised substantive evi-
dence on the following theory: if the jury can be convinced that a convicted
murderer and relative of the defendant is so certain of his guilt that he has at-
tempted to construct a false defense for him, it will of necessity be influenced to
believe that he is guilty. This possibility and the possible prejudice to defendant
from the mere association of his cause with a convicted murderer are probably the
major policy objections to the court's conclusion, and it is unfortunate that they
have not been more thoroughly explored. The possibility of prejudice in the instant
case was minimal, however, in that Jordan would of necessity have been called as a.
defense witness, at which time the state could have elicited the fact of his prior
conviction.
21. Matz v. United States, 81 App. D.C. 326, 58 F.2d 190 (1946). See also
6 WimtOR, EVIDENCS §§ 1867, 1871 (3d ed. 1940). It should be noted that the
opinion does not indicate the precise reason which defense counsel assigned for his
objection, nor does it discuss in any detail the possibility of prejudice to the de-
fendant in permitting the state to attempt to puncture the defense before it is de-
veloped by defense counsel.
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found some support in the Third Circuit,22 where it has been held that
a party is not bound by the uncontradicted testimony of his own witness,
from which one could conclude that the calling party might impeach
such a witness. 23 Likewise, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a recent
opinion has also sanctioned the prosecutor's revelation of the criminal
record of a prosecution witness, although it refused to characterize the
process as one of self-impeachment.2 4 There is also some language in
the recent decisions of the Texas courts indicating that they will permit
the state in a criminal prosecution to impeach its own witness if he
testifies to facts which are injurious to the state's case.25
Although the instant case is contrary to the weight of authority
the result is rationally acceptable, because the three basic reasons under-
lying the rule against self-impeachment have no application here.26  The
testimony of the impeached witness was contradicted by the investigating
officers, hence the state was not bound by it in any case. Moreover, one
cannot realistically be said to vouch for the credibility of his witness,
since one has no control over the persons who by pure chance witness
an occurrence or find a weapon. Finally, the threat that the state could
coerce the witness to render testimony favorable to its case by the threat
of character assassination is not present here, because the witness's testi-
mony was essentially in support of the defendant's theory of self-
defense. The prosecutor would undoubtedly have elicited the existence
of Jordan's criminal record from him on cross examination,27 since he
would of necessity have been a principal defense witness as well. There-
fore, the disclosure of this fact at an earlier stage in the proceedings
cannot be regarded as unduly prejudicial to the defendant. It is con-
ceivable that the court could have reached the same result without any
reliance on the prior New Jersey authority permitting self-impeachment.
For example, the court could have reasoned that Jordan was a witness
whom the state was "compelled" to call in order to account for the
appearance of the ice pick as well as the state's possession of it.2s Al-
ternatively, it could have reasoned that Jordan was not really the state's
witness,2 9 since the evidence furnished by him was relevant to the de-
22. Johnson v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 208 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1953).
23. No attempt at impeachment was made in the Johnson case. The logical
relation between its holding and the abolition of the rule prohibiting self-impeachment,
however, is vigorously asserted by Dean Wigmore. 3 WIGMOR4, EVID4NCZ § 896
(3d ed. 1940). Cf. Meeks v. United States, 179 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1950).
24. "We see no reason to nullify a prosecutor's maneuver in anticipating what
he may be sure defense counsel will bring out. This is not impeaching counsel's own
witness, but rather the legitimate thrust and riposte of trial tactics." Commonwealth
v. Garrison, 398 Pa. 47, 50, 157 A.2d 75, 77 (1959).
25. Crandall v. State, 340 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960).
26. See note 5 supra.
27. Gundin v. Barron, 16 N.J. Super. 1, 83 A.2d 790 (1951).
28. Meeks v. United States, 179 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1950).
29. "It is not the 'calling' . . . that makes one your witness but the eliciting of
favorable testimony." Fall Brook Co. v. Hewson, 158 N.Y. 1, 52 N.E. 1095 (1899).
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fendant's case; :30 consequently, Jordan could be regarded as a defense
witness in regard to whom the prosecutor would have the normal privi-
leges of cross examination. The court might also have chosen to ignore
the question of impeachment entirely, and view this situation as the
permissive trial tactic of anticipating the adversary's defense.81 In view
of these available alternatives, it would be imprudent to attempt to ex-
tract from the principal case the generalization that one may always im-
peach his own witness by prior criminal convictions in the state of
New Jersey. The limited precedents available have all involved self-
impeachment by the state in criminal prosecutions, and there remains
the possibility that a court in the future might definitely construe the
New Jersey statute as using "examination" as a synonym for "cross ex-
amination." New Jersey has certainly not gone as far as to adopt the
rationale of the Model Code of Evidence32 or the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, 33 both of which abolish the prohibition against self-impeach-
ment in its entirety.8 4 However, in view of the widespread permissibility
now accorded by the courts to self-impeachment by prior contradictory
statements, the trend of the law may well be toward the abolition of the
general prohibition of self-impeachment, the second phase of which is
beginning to manifest itself in decisions such as the instant case which
permit the impeachment of one's own witness by prior criminal con-
victions.
John S. Fields
TORTS-INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTRESS-REPEATED
PROPOSALS OF ILLICIT INTERCOURSE SUPPORT CAUSE or ACTION.
Samms v. Eccles (Utah 1961)
Plaintiff, a married woman, brought an action to recover damages
for severe mental and emotional suffering resulting from repeated inde-
cent proposals made by the defendant. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that,,
between May and December of 1957, defendant repeatedly and persistently
solicited her to have illicit sexual relations with him, calling her by
phone for this purpose at least fifteen or possibly more than twenty-five
30. A witness is generally considered to be the witness of the party for whom
he first furnishes relevant evidence. Milton v. State, 40 Fla. 251, 24 So. 60 (1898).
31. See Commonwealth v. Garrison, 398 Pa. 47, 157 A.2d 75 (1959).
32. Rule 106.
33. Rule 20.
34. State v. Cooper, 10 N.J. 532, 92 A.2d 786 (1952) (will not permit self-
impeachment by evidence of lack of trustworthiness based upon community reputation).
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times at various hours, including late at night. On one occasion, defend-
ant allegedly went to the plaintiff's residence and made an indecent
exposure of his person while making such a solicitation. As a result of
defendant's conduct, plaintiff suffered great anxiety, fear for her personal
safety, and severe emotional distress, for which she sought fifteen hun-
dred dollars in actual damages and a like amount in punitive damages.
At pretrial, the district court, after noting that plaintiff's cause of action
was based on infliction of emotional distress by wilful, wanton, and
outrageous conduct, dismissed the complaint on the ground that it showed
no basis upon which relief could be granted. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Utah, with two justices dissenting, reversed, holding that, al-
though there is no cause of action for negligent infliction of mental
distress, the intentional infliction of such distress is an actionable tort.
Samms v. Eccles, 358 P. 2d 344 (Utah 1961).
Except in actions for assault,' the common law rule was that one's
peace of mind was not a legally protectable interest, even as against
intentional invasions. 2 Some courts rejected damage claims based solely
on mental suffering because they believed that the intangible and sub-
jective nature of such suffering made it impossible to be objectively
valued in pecuniary terms,5 but such reasoning was hardly persuasive
since the same courts had no trouble in assessing damages for mental
anguish in cases where there was only the slightest physical touching.4
Other courts offered the more valid objection that permitting recovery
for such a subjective type of injury would open the door to many
fictitious and fraudulent claims, 5 but this position was criticized because
the possibility of fraudulent litigation had not prevented the courts from
protecting other interests. 6 Even with their predilection to disallow mental
distress claims, the courts were not adverse to protecting the feelings
pf passengers from insulting carriers, on a theory that the carrier con-
1. I. de S. v. W. de S., Y.B. 22 Edw. III, f. 99 pl. 60 (1348). This case well
known to every first year law student held, that a tavern keeper's wife had a
legally protectable right to be free from the apprehension of being hit by an irate,
hatchet-swinging customer. This was one of the earliest cases in which there was
judicial recognition that one has a right to be free from mental as well as physical
harm.
2. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV.
L. Rpv. 1033 (1936).
3. Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.C. 577, 598, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861). It was
here that Lord Wenslydale made his oft-quoted remark that: "Mental pain or
anxiety the law cannot value, when the unlawful act complained of causes that
alone." Many courts have followed such reasoning. E.g., Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis.
1, 81 N.W. 1003 (1900).
4. Draper v. Baker,, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N.W. 527 (1884). Damages of twelve
hundred dollars were not thought too great for the indignity suffered by the
plaintiff when the defendant spit in his face. In Ragsdale v. Ezell, 99 Ky. 236, 49
S.W. 775 (1899), the law placed a value of seven hundred dollars on a hug and a
kiss.
5. Spade v. Lynn & B. R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) ; Huston v.
Borough of Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 61 Atl. 1022 (1905).
6. Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. Rev. 260, 276 (1921).
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tracted to provide civility as well as transportation.7 This liability was
soon divorced from a contract theory and justified on the basis of a
duty owed the public, 8 and was extended to cover others in similar
positions, such as innkeepers,9 and theater owners. 10 Finally, in Wilkenson
v. Downton," an English court rejected the common law rule, and
held a callous practical joker liable for the mental distress he had caused
a woman by falsely telling her that her husband had been seriously
injured. However, most courts remained reluctant to make such a
frontal attack on a settled rule of law, and preferred a more subtle
advance by allowing recovery for mental distress as parasitic damages
after finding a technical commission of an established tort, such as as-
sault,12 battery,"3 false imprisonment,'1 4 or trespass to land.' 5 These para-
sitic damage cases were the prelude to a new, independent tort of in-
tentional infliction of mental distress.' 6 In recent years there has been
increasing judicial acknowledgement of this tort,1 7 and, except in Ohio,' 8
the trend has been to recognize that this cause of action has a separate
legal existence apart from other established torts.19 However, the metes
and bounds have yet to be clearly marked, and there has been much
uncertainty as to the scope and requisites of this modern tort.20  Even
7. Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason 242, 5 Fed. Cas. 413, No. 2,575 (C.D.D.
Mass. 1823). There a ship carrier's contract was held to call for politeness to a
passenger, as well as passage.
8. Texas & P. Ry. v. Jones, 39 S.W. 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897). Indecent
remarks were addressed to the plaintiff in a railroad station before she had purchased
a ticket, and the court permitted recovery, even in the abscence of a contractual
relationship.
9. Moody v. Kenny, 153 La. 1007, 97 So. 21 (1923).
10. Saenger Theatres Corp. v. Herndon, 180 Miss. 791, 178 So. 86 (1938).
11. 2 Q.B.D. 57 (1897).
12. Leach v. Leach, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 699, 33 S.W. 703 (1895). Foul breath
and speech constituted an assault, enabling the plaintiff to recover for outrage to
her feelings caused by the defendant's indecent advances.
13. DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881). A battery was
committed when the defendant lightly touched the plaintiff, justifying recovery for
the resulting shame and mortification.
14. Gadsdon Gen. Hosp. v. Hamilton, 212 Ala. 531, 103 So. 553 (1925). Eleven
hours detention in a hospital entitled the plaintiff to fifteen hundred dollars in
damages for mental distress.
15. Engle v. Simmons, 148 Ala. 92, 41 So. 1023 (1906). A bill collector was
found to be a trespasser to land and liable for the mental anguish he caused the
plaintiff, a pregnant woman.
16. 1 STRUT, FOUNDATIONS or LCAL LIABILITY, 460, 470 (1906). "A factor
which is today recognized as parasitic will, forsooth, to-morrow be recognized as an
independent basis of liability."
17. This is reflected by the change of position of Restatement. In RSTXT NT,
TORTS § 46 (1934), there was no independent action for intentionally causing
mental distress, except in the cases of assault or where there was special liability
of carriers for insult. However, in RiSTATEMENT, TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948),
intentional infliction of emotional distress was recognized and approved, as a distinct
tort.
18. In Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E.2d 735 (1948), the Supreme
Court of Ohio refused to grant relief to a pregnant plaintiff who had suffered mental
damages from the vile epithets hurled at her by the defendant.
19. PROSSIER, TORTS § 11 (2d ed. 1955).
20. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIV. L. Riv. 40 (1956). An excellent
discussion of this new tort, with proposals as to the requisites that should be required
for its application.
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though the contours have not been fully delineated, it is generally agreed
that the basis of liability must be conduct of an "outrageous" char-
acter.21 Up to the present time, an indecent proposal has not been
held to be actionable under this test. 22
At first glance, therefore, the Supreme Court of Utah would seem
to have expanded the concept of that type of conduct which is deemed
to be needful of legal sanction. On closer examination, however, the
decision in the present case is not as radical as it might seem. It has
been recognized that our courts should not be burdened, under the guise
of this new tort, with disputes over insults, bad manners, and trivialities
which are better left to other instruments of social control. 23  Conse-
quently, as a safeguard against trivial or fictitious claims, it is required
that liability should be posited only on "outrageous" conduct. Gen-
erally, two different kinds of conduct have been found to be sufficiently
"outrageous." One type is found in those cases in which a single act
of the defendant has been so reprehensible that the courts have had
no qualms about imposing liability. The cruel joke is a prime example
of this manner of action.2 4 A proposal of illicit intercourse has yet to
be included in this category of "outrageous" behavior, 25 and the court
in the instant case acknowledged this fact, indicating that normally such
a solicitation would not be actionable. However, a second type of
"outrageous" conduct has also been recognized in those cases in which
a single act of the defendant, by itself, is not actionable, but, because the
act is done repeatedly, the courts find that his conduct, taken as a
whole, is "outrageous." The cases involving bill collectors who con-
tinually harass their debtors with undue pressure and repeated threats
are illustrative of this type of situation. 26 One threat is not actionable,
but repeated threats of coercion can qualify as "outrageous" behavior.
Such courts show an awareness of the psychological fact that, not only
can sudden shock injure the mind, but that a constant pressure on this
mechanism can be equally deleterious. 27  The instant case falls within
21. Ibid.
22. Reed v. Maley, 115 Ky. 816, 74 S.W. 1079 (1903); Prince v. Ridge, 32
Misc. Rep. 666, 66 N.Y.S. 454 (1900) ; According to Prosser, these older cases still
represent the view taken by the courts. (See note 20 supra); But see Mitran v.
Williamson, 21 Misc. 2d 1016, 197 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1960).
23. See Magruder, note 2 supra.
24. Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920). In that case a cruel
trick was played on an elderly lady by deceiving her into thinking she had found
gold, and damages were allowed for the resulting mental distress.
25. Dean Prosser wonders how much longer some of our more conservative
tribunals will be able to stand the strain in rejecting such actions. See note 20
supra.
26. E.g., Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932)
(a collection agency was held liable for the mental anguish caused the plaintiff in
receiving a series of threatening letters. For a discussion of the collection cases,
see Borda, One's Right to Enjoy Mental Peace and Tranquility, 28 Go. L.J. 55(1939).
27. Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease, 30 VA. L. Rev. 193
(1944).
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this second category of "outrageous" conduct. It was not the making
of an indecent proposal alone that was decisive, but rather the repeated
and persistent attempts at seduction and the manner in which they
were made. Any one of the defendant's acts, standing by itself, might
not justify the decision here, but the combination of his acts of re-
peated solicitation, phone calls at all hours, and, perhaps most signifi-
cantly, indecent exposure of his person do support the result. The totality
of his conduct rendered it "outrageous" and largely negated the possibility
of a fraudulent claim for mental distress. It will be seen that the re-
quirement of "outrageous" conduct serves a double purpose; it protects
the courts from being compelled to adjudicate cases arising from "hurt
feelings" or other trivialities, and it minimizes the danger of fictitious
claims by requiring conduct which would normally result in genuine
mental or emotional suffering. It would appear that the whole line of
conduct of the defendant in the instant case, and most especially his a!-
leged indecent exposure,28 would be sufficient to satisfy these require-
ments. Those who share the common law fear of fraudulent mental dis-
tress claims insist that the mental suffering should manifest itself in
physical symptoms before it be regarded as actionable. This safeguard,
however, would seem to be superfluous where the defendant's conduct
is of a genuinely "outrageous" character. 29
The dissenting justices, while agreeing with the majority opinion
in principle, objected that plaintiff's complaint was fatally defective in
that it did not allege that defendant's acts were done with the inten-
tion of causing mental distress to the plaintiff, or that defendant knew
or reasonably should have known that such distress would result. As
to the first point, it is clear from the decided cases that intent to cause
mental anguish as such is not required; it is only necessary that the
defendant have intentionally performed the objectionable acts from which
such anguish is a foreseeable result. The bill-collector, for example, re-
sorts to harassing methods only to make his debtor pay, but liability
is imposed because the resulting mental distress is a reasonably fore-
seeable consequence. In the instant case, the minority opinion would
seem to be erroneous in concluding as a matter of law that a reasonable
man could not have foreseen the emotional distress caused plaintiff by
defendant's alleged conduct. In conclusion, therefore, the instant decision
may be taken to be in accord with the growing tendency giving judicial
recognition to the individual's right to have his mental as well as physical
interests protected.
John B. Taulane, Jr.
28. It is indeed arguable that the alleged indecent exposure in itself is sufficient
to render defendant's conduct "outrageous and intolerable" according to the "generally
accepted standards of decency and morality." Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 345
(1961).
29. Wade, Tort Liability For Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REv.
63 (1950).
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TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-INAPPLICABILITY OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR AS
BASIS OF RECOVERY FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED FROM FOREIGN
MATTER CONTAINED IN SOFT DRINK BOTTLE.
Milligan v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. (Utah 1960).
Plaintiff brought suit against a retailer and also against a bottler of
soft drinks for damages allegedly suffered when he swallowed a paper
clip while drinking the bottler's product. He had purchased two six-
packs of the soft drink from the retailer and placed them in an unlocked
fruit room connected with his garage. Numerous persons had access
to the place of storage, including invitees to a birthday party, who had
used eleven of the bottles. It was five weeks later, while drinking out
of the last bottle, that plaintiff allegedly swallowed the paper clip; sub-
sequently, another paper clip was found in the bottle. Plaintiff's com-
plaint asserted three theories of recovery, namely, implied warranty;
violation of an adulterated food statute; and negligence which plaintiff
sought to prove by application of res ipsa loquitur. 1 At pre-trial, de-
fendant bottler offered to show the great care taken in the bottling
process, and plaintiff elected to stand on his complaint. The lower court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed.
The Supreme Court of Utah, with two justices dissenting, affirmed holding
that res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable, since one of the doctrine's requisites,
control by the defendants when the injurious paper clip entered the
bottle, could not possibly be shown on the facts alleged.2 Milligan v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 11 Utah 2d 30, 354 P. 2d 580 (1960).
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was formally baptized approximately
one hundred years ago by the English jurist, Baron Pollack, 3 and since
that time it has been widely accepted by the American courts, but not
without much confusion and controversy. 4 It is based upon the simple
premise that there are certain types of unusual accidents where the
surrounding circumstances are such as to logically indicate that the
1. A latin term, meaning, "the thing speaks for itself."
2. The plaintiff's claim of breach of warranty and violation of the adulterated
food statute were also found to be insufficient, since they were only supported by
general allegations.
3. In Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H.&C. 722, 725, 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 300 (1863),
the plaintiff, while passing the defendant's shop, was hit by a barrell falling from
the shop window. It was held that the facts established a prima facie case of
negligence on the part of the defendant, and Baron Pollack stated his now famous
pronouncement: "There are certain cases of which it may be said res ipsa loquitur,
and this seems one of them."
4. Morris, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Texas, 26 Ttx. L. Rtv. 257 (1948), presents
an excellent analysis of the conflicts that have developed in the American courts.
South Carolina claims that it does not recognize the doctrine, but actually applies
it as a fact inference. Hollis v. Armour & Co., 190 S.C. 170, 2 S.E.2d 681 (1939).
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defendant was probably negligent.5 These circumstances, upon which
the doctrine rests, have been formulated into its three requirements,0
which are: that the accident must be one that does not normally occur
without negligence on someone's part, that the plaintiff must be free of
any contributory fault,7 and that the injury must result from an instru-
mentality in the exclusive control of the defendant.8 A great deal of
dispute has developed over the probative aspects of the doctrine.9 Penn-
sylvania courts have taken the extreme position that res ipsa loquitur
shifts the burden of proof to the defendant,10 while other courts have
adopted the less radical view that it merely compels the defendant to
go forward with the evidence." However, the majority rule is that
the doctrine will permit the jury to find for the plaintiff but not com-
pel it to do so. 12 An even more basic source of controversy, as illus-
trated by the present case, is whether res ipsa loquitur can be applied
in contaminated food cases. 13 Some courts hold that literal adherence
to the requirement of defendant's exclusive control of the injuring in-
strumentality prohibits application of the doctrine.14 Nevertheless, the
majority of courts permit the plaintiff to invoke res ipsa loquitur in
these cases, 15 even though they do not always refer to the doctrine ex-
pressly by name. 16 The control requirement is circumvented by liberal
theorizing that the defendant's control continues right into the hands of
5. PROSSER, TORTS § 42 (2d ed. 1955). It is Prosser's position that much of the
confusion surrounding the doctrine is the result of intermingling it with the principles
of a carrier's absolute liability, and the burden of proof issue. He cites Pennsylvania
courts as prime offenders. (See also note 10 infra.)
6. Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 3 H.&C. 596, 159 Eng. Rep.
665 (Ex. 1865), is generally cited as the case which formulated the requirements.
7. Some states, including Utah, reduce the requirements to two, by including the
plaintiff's freedom from fault as implicitly embodied in the requirement of exclusive
control by the defendant. White v. Pinney, 99 Utah 484, 108 P.2d 249 (1940).
8. WIGMORE, EvIDENcE § 2509 (3d ed. 1940). Some courts cite a fourth re-
quirement, that the defendant must be in a better position to determine the cause
of the accident, but this is actually a reason for the doctrine and not one of its
requirements. Fricke, Of Mice and Men, and Unrefreshing Pauses, 3 U. QUEENS-
LAND L.J. 321 (1956).
9. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CALIF. L. Rev. 183 (1949).
10. Because of the harshness of this approach with respect to the defendant,
Pennsylvania courts have limited the application of res ipsa loquitur to cases where
there are contractual relationships involved, such as with accidents of carriers.
Pennsylvania also has an "exclusive control doctrine" which is actually res ipsa
loquitur as applied by the majority of courts, having the procedural effect of creating
a permissive inference. See, 85 U. PA. L. Rev. 212 (1936).
11. Schechter v. Hann, 305 Ky. 794, 205 S.W.2d 690 (1947); Sims v. Dallas
Ry. & Terminal Co., 135 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
12. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 19.11 (1956). Sweeney v. Ewing, 228 U.S.
233 (1913).
13. Fricke, Supra note 8.
14. Condon, Product Liability Cases - 1957, Sept. 1958 INs. L.J. 615.
15. Ibid.
16. The doctrine's principles are often applied without citing it by name.
Some courts hold an inference of negligence is created, Corin v. S.S. Kresge Co.,
10 N.J. Misc. 489, 159 A. 799, aff'd 110 N.J.L. 378, 166 A. 291 (1932) ; other courts
speak in terms of a prima facie case of negligence, Smith v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 152 Pa. Super. 445, 33 A.2d 488 (1943).
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the consumer,' 7 or that it is control at the time of the negligence rather
than at the time of injury which is determinative.' 8 Where a container
may be opened and resealed by a third party without detection, however,
a number of courts revert to a stricter construction of the control re-
quirement, and require plaintiff to show a lack of opportunity of third
party tampering if he is to avail himself of the doctrine's aid.' 9 However,
it would seem that the majority of courts hold that merely a showing
that foreign matter was in the container is sufficient to enable the
plaintiff to invoke the doctrine, regardless of the type of container in-
volved.
20
In Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,21 the Supreme Court of Utah
adopted the rule that the plaintiff must demonstrate a lack of opportunity
for tampering, before res ipsa loquitur is applicable, and the court in
the present case followed the precedent. This would appear to be an
unfortunate choice on the basis of both logic and policy. As the dissent
points out, res ipsa loquitur should not be barred because of the rela-
tively remote possibility that a prankster removed the bottle cap, de-
posited two paper clips, and then was able to reseal the bottle. The
majority's position seems even more questionable when one considers the
improbability that, if such a prank did occur, the manipulation would
go undetected.2 2  Even in other jurisdictions which have followed the
Jordan case, 23 there has not been the strict construction of the control
requirement that is found in the instant case but only the requirement
that there be no likelihood of tampering.2 4 One court, while adhering
to the Utah position in principle, rejected the view that the plaintiff
must show a lack of any possiblity of tampering and held that it was
17. Duval v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 329 Ill. App. 290, 68 N.E.2d 479 (1946).
18. Fricke, The Use of Expert Evidence in Res Ipsa Loquitur Cases, 5 VILL.
L. REv. 59 (1959).
19. Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 158 S.W.2d 721
(1942). This landmark case distinguished between different types of product
liability cases, and held that in cases involving containers with removable caps,
the plaintiff cannot successfully apply res ipsa loquitur, unless he establishes
continuous control bythe defendant.
20. Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dillard, 208 Okla. 126, 253 P.2d 847
(1953); Fisher v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 84 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir.
1936).
21. 117 Utah 578, 218 P.2d 660 (1950). Here the plaintiff allegedly found
a fly in a soda he had received from a vending machine. The court, while recog-
nizing that res ipsa loquitur is generally held applicable in such cases, refused to
apply the doctrine here because the plaintiff could not show a lack of opportunity
for third party tampering.
22. The dissent stated that if the bottle had been opened to insert the paper clips,
the fizz in the soda would have been destroyed and the cap would have been loose.
23. See supra, note 21.
24. Underhill v. Anciaux, 68 Nev. 69, 226 P.2d 794 (1951). Plaintiff drank a
"coke" with black slime contained therein, and the court allowed recovery on a res
ipsa loquitur theory. The Jordan case (note 21 supra) was distinguished because the
soda was purchased at a factory where men were likely to play jokes, while here
the soda had only been in the possession of a retailer, and the plaintiff, and on
these facts the court felt there was no reasonable likelihood of tampering. In
Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathy, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P2d 1094 (1957), it
was held that the question of tampering was one for the jury.
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enough for the plaintiff to demonstrate a lack of probability of tamper-
ing.25 On policy grounds, there are even more cogent reasons for re-
jecting. the instant decision. In cases like the present, the court faces
the choice of allowing res ipsa loquitur, with the possiblity of foisting
a fraudulent claim upon the bottler, or of refusing to apply the doc-
trine, thereby denying the plaintiff, as a practical matter, of any chance
to recover on a theory of negligence.26 The Utah courts have found
the former possibility more alarming, and have selected the latter solu-
tion.2 7 In doing so, they are running counter to the trend toward im-
posing an insurer's liability on the distributors of defective food products.28
Sound reasoning and modern social concepts support the position that
it is more important to protect the consumer against defective food
products than the producer against possible fraudulent claims. Even
recognizing the need to prevent fraudulent claims, the decision here
lacks justification, because the plaintiff could produce X-rays to illus-
trate that he actually had swallowed the paper clip.29 Therefore the
result reached seems out of step both with the principles of res ipsa
loquitur and the current development of the law in product liability cases.
John B. Taulane, Jr.
25. Tafoya v. Las Cruces Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 59 N.M. 43, 278 P.2d 577
(1955).
26. 3 UTAH L. Rnv. 113 (1955).
27. Ibid.
28. Fricke, supra note 8; Mr. Justice Traynor's much-noted concurring opinion
in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), contains a
frank call for absolute liability on policy grounds in all product liability cases.
29. The dissent makes a strong point of this fact, but it was ignored by the
majority.
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